Interview with Gen. Tun Myat Naing and Ko Aung Zaw - The Irrawaddy
Archieved by Arakan Bay News (ABN)
Part # 1 - September 20th 2025
Interviewer: This week, we plan to discuss Rakhine State’s current situation; the Arakan Army’s political and military posture; the challenges facing Rakhine civilians; the latest situation of Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine; as well as Myanmar’s broader political and revolutionary landscape and relations with neighboring countries.
First of all, I’d like to thank General Tun Myat Naing for agreeing to give this exclusive interview to The Irrawaddy.
Good morning, General Tun Myat Naing.
The General: Good morning, Ko Aung Zaw.
Interviewer: Thank you for granting The Irrawaddy this exclusive interview. Around this same time last year, we also did an interview. So we’re meeting again this year. What’s different this time is that recently there’s been a lot of news about Rakhine—especially one story that drew attention domestically, internationally, even among foreign diplomats: you personally traveled to Rakhine, re-opened an old mosque in Maungdaw, and met with local people. That has generated a lot of interest and many questions for today’s interview.
To begin, as a Rakhine leader and as the leader of the AA, how did you feel on your first return to Rakhine State? Let’s start there.
The General: Fine—very good.
Interviewer: How did it feel to go back? What did you see? How did local people respond?
The General: Returning to Rakhine—our homeland—was something I’d envisaged from day one after I left Rakhine. It marks a turning point in our revolutionary journey. Before the trip, we prepared extensively—special units trained for months in advance: where to go, how to move, everything. We studied carefully because Rakhine revolutionary leaders in the 1970s and after made sacrifices and suffered setbacks along this path.
I can’t disclose everything now because the revolution isn’t over, but we executed the trip successfully. Touching down in my homeland on June 6—right in the rainy season—was unforgettable. The sea breeze, the winds—it was special.
At the same time, this is one of the hardest periods for our people: intense battles are ongoing. So standing with the people and our comrades under the same sky and on the same soil, sharing their hardships and fighting together—this is a meaningful step in our history that strengthens both the people and our fighters.
Interviewer: Someday, when the revolution is over, there will be many books to read about how you returned. For now, as a Rakhine leader who has just gone back and met local people, and even re-opened an old mosque—these are big developments. Meanwhile, there’s also talk of international aid to Rohingya in Bangladesh being cut, debates about their “peaceful” or “dignified repatriation,” and calls from the international community. What have you planned or set in motion regarding these issues?
The General: This isn’t just about the situation in Rakhine; it connects to Myanmar as a whole and even to global dynamics. I won’t go into everything. For Bangladesh, repatriation is a top priority. But inside Myanmar there’s civil war, along with hunger and many other problems. For us, addressing these is the first priority.
Globally, donations to refugee camps have declined. The host country wants to send the burden back across the border. Yet humanitarian decisions should be grounded in human rights and compassion. Rakhine is a war zone with no real security and little prospect for political or livelihood solutions at the moment. Forcing people back to an active conflict area because funding is short—what principle is that based on? There are many questions.
Simultaneously, cross-border militancy has intensified, and certain border security institutions support, encourage, or exploit it. We face growing challenges more than a single “enemy.”
As for our strategy, we operate discreetly and systematically because our resources—materiel and manpower—are limited. We speak only as much as necessary and keep working without pause. Managing border issues requires special care. Before, the headquarters was far away and command relied on technology. Now that I am closer, I can provide more direct leadership—addressing misunderstandings in places like Paletwa, Buthidaung, and Maungdaw.
On August 30, we held a meeting with Muslim religious leaders, community elders, and our officers. We emphasized citizenship, rights and responsibilities, and the need to stand on the right side of history during this decisive period. We stressed not to let “extremist” agendas use them as pawns. If you fulfill duties responsibly, rights follow naturally.
They also shared their views. We highlighted that over the past 70+ years there have been repeated ethnic and religious tensions, leaving suspicion and pain. But since the AA arrived and administered these areas, there have been no ethnic-religious clashes. In central Rakhine where Muslims and Rakhine live together, trade and social ties have improved—why is that? We agreed to keep improving.
Regarding the reopening of the historic mosque, we agreed: it’s a matter of citizens’ rights. It should be opened. But to prevent extremist exploitation, the mosque committee and the Islamic council must manage it carefully. We reached collective understandings on these points.
Interviewer: So the ground reception has been good, and stability could deepen over time. You also used the term “militancy.” If there are actors trying to foment more militancy, who are the culprits?
If forces are deliberately increasing militancy, who are the main perpetrators as you assess?
The General: There isn’t just one hand; there are many. But the original midwife (that gave the birth of current militancy) was the military junta (SAC) now SaKaMa (SSPC). Back when we were about to fully take Buthidaung and Maungdaw, they were already gathering people, giving trainings, and waging ideological warfare: “This area doesn’t belong to the Rakhine,” telling (muslims) villagers to fight and promising rights and citizenship afterward.
But they failed to stop our advance, and those people didn’t trust them entirely—rather, they seized the opportunity. When the junta’s forces fled, elements within Bangladesh’s security institutions that had long been sympathetic to militancy stepped in. Even before the junta widely armed and trained groups, those institutions had nurtured the RSO. First they raised the RSO; when it no longer served, ARSA emerged. As ARSA grew strong, crime and narcotics flourished; the patron couldn’t control the fire he lit, so he cracked down on ARSA leaders and then put the RSO back on stage, pressuring us to cooperate: “Work with these groups; they’ll fight your common enemy.”
We refused. That created resentment. Now, as we consolidate control over the region, they can’t accept it. They are mounting conventional and unconventional attacks to undermine our legitimacy—using RSO and others they’ve fostered. These actors aren’t true friends to each other, but at this moment they share interests. If the junta hits us from the rear, our forces must turn towards them; meanwhile, certain Bangladeshi officers encouraging militants say, “Even if you can’t take Taung Pyo (bordered town), hit the areas north of it—use whatever you have.” (referring to the sneaking attacks by the militants)
Since last night, after such incitement, our bases have been surrounded and fighting is ongoing.
Interviewer: So both the Bangladesh side and the Myanmar military side have armed RSO, ARSA, and “people’s militant” forces to worsen the situation, and their main target is the AA. Meanwhile, there are calls for repatriation, and we also see new accusations of human-rights abuses by AA—allegations that spiked around a recent international conference on Rohingya in Bangladesh. What would you say to these accusations?
The General: These conferences stem from proposals by Bangladesh’s current interim leader, Dr. Yunus, who came from an activist background. His policy style is activist-oriented: promises like “You will return to your homeland before Eid.” Whether that’s feasible given the realities in Rakhine seems secondary to him.
As donations for refugees decline, they need to elevate the issue to attract donors and implement their strategy. “Repatriation” is framed in many ways: some ordinary people genuinely want to come back peacefully, obey Myanmar’s laws, and pursue harmony; but militants seek to leverage international intervention (R2P, etc.) to implement their separate agendas.
Diaspora networks in Europe (of Rohingya) — who wear human-rights and civil-rights masks—are in fact key policy drivers behind militant groups. We have audio: offering youths USD 2,000 to attack in Rakhine, scripting statements, and steering narratives. For them, “repatriation” means returning with weapons or under international protection.
They tried to invite us first to that conference through various channels—including diplomats and contacts in Bangladesh—to gain advantage if we attended. We were very cautious. If militants hijack such a forum, the outcome moves away from peaceful, united political solutions toward their track. We monitored this first conference; they had difficulties, so they exaggerated problems to fundraise, using “genocide” claims to craft media narratives and pull in donors—while blaming us.
In reality, in any war zone you’ll find scattered bones and skulls. They manipulate such facts to present the picture they want.
Interviewer: You mean they’re changing the narrative.
The General: Yes—presenting it that way.
Regarding the Htan Shauk Khan affair: it’s a village of around 900 people—about 800 remain alive. The former village administrator is there; religious elders are there. We relocated them to a new site called “Htan Shauk Khan New Village.” If there had been massacre as they were accusing (600+ villagers being killed), in a village of 900 only 200 would be left—not 800.
We also have testimony from those present in the fighting, including deputy-company-level personnel and families of junta soldiers. In some of the images they circulated—when they pulled up a pile of bones—military boots and steel helmets were visible. They rushed to construct their narrative, but the facts themselves expose them.
They claim “Everyone was massacred on May 2, 2024,” yet that’s the very day junta troops were withdrawing into the village; no battle had even started then. That day we were using loudspeakers from neighboring villages with Muslim leaders, urging civilians to relocate. Their dates are inconsistent.
We’ve seen this before—showing corpses from other countries and claiming they’re from Rakhine. If the truth becomes clearer, better outcomes are possible.
Interviewer: International media have their own narratives toward both AA and the Myanmar military. There have been instances where AA was accused of human-rights violations against Muslims in Rakhine, with purported evidence. Between these communities there have been many conflicts. How will AA address this? What is your strategy? Journalists and our audience want to know about reconciliation.
The General: This is wartime. Rakhine has been blocked by the junta from sea, air, and land for over four years—on top of earlier blockades during COVID and during previous fighting. People have suffered greatly and many fled to other regions like Yangon. Muslim communities along the border also fled under pressure.
In such compressed wartime conditions, some groups are trying to take advantage of other groups by manipulations and traps.. Some see only “human rights,” without context. In today’s climate, even casual words can be labeled an offense.
International media often cast us one-sidedly. According to dominant global narratives, Muslims in Rakhine are always the genocide victims. But in Buthidaung and Maungdaw border areas, it’s often non-Muslims—Hindus included—who have been targeted in massacres; Christians and Buddhists too; even people with no religion. That population segment is now down to around 4%—it used to be about 10% before many fled or were killed.
Recently, when militants were convened by certain Bangladeshi authorities and pressured to “go in with whatever you have,” fighting resumed last night and is ongoing. When their groups enter, they kill civilians at the border, then dress bodies in AA uniforms or claim they were AA casualties for media effect. People must understand this.
We have no Qatari donors, no major media to boost our narrative. Instead, they wage “lawfare,” legal harassment, and synchronized campaigns: human-rights accusations, trainings, material support for militants, and international conferences—all in a comprehensive strategy.
Those conferences will never acknowledge that, under ULA administration, there have been no ethnic-religious clashes between Muslims and Rakhine in central Rakhine; that relations have improved; that we’ve tried to support Muslims’ basic needs—health, education, livelihoods—amid scarcity. On the ground we must confront militants while also caring for civilians.
This kind of accusation campaign can hit any country—America, China, whoever—and it hits us harder. In Myanmar, whoever governs gets pulled down by the same clauses and mechanisms—be it the junta, the NLD if it returned, or the NUG if it won. So we’re not surprised to be targeted.
We’ll continue to address matters with confidence in the truth. Step by step, as I said earlier, we will build trust with Muslim citizens—on rights and responsibilities, loyalty to Myanmar and to the Arakan region, and cooperation for peace. Less talk, more tangible work—that’s how we’re building reconciliation.
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